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1. Introduction 
This year, Thomas John Sargent won the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) Award for Scientific 
Reviewing, the Mathematical Sciences Research Institute (MSRI) Prize in Innovative Quantitative 
Applications, and the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for his “empirical research on cause 
and effect in the macroeconomy" [1]. It is therefore a great honor for me to write my paper on “Some 
Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic”, a paper he published in 1981 along with Neil Wallace [2]. 
Previously, in 1973, Sargent and Wallace had published another paper together: “The Stability 
Models of Money and Growth with Perfect Foresight”, where they showed that a once-and-for-all rise in 
the money supply produces a one-time-only increase in the price level instead of setting off a process of 
ever-accelerating deflation; thus keeping the system at its steady state equilibrium rather than being 
dynamically unstable (as in “saddle points”) [3]. 
“Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic” was inspired by Milton Friendman’s “The Role of 
Monetary Policy”, a paper published in 1968 and based on his own presidential address delivered the 
year before at the 18th Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association (AEA). In it, Friedman 
argued that monetary policy could not exert substantial control over the long-run levels of real output, 
unemployment, or real rates of return on securities, only over the inflation rate [4].  
Sargent and Wallace proposed themselves to correct Friedman’s statement, claiming that even 
inflation cannot be permanently influenced by monetary policy. Moreover, they showed how a tighter 
monetary policy can actually lead to a higher rate of inflation instead: if the fiscal authority does not 
adjust its budgets accordingly (thus accumulating a large amount of debt during this time of low 
seigniorage revenue), later on it will need to be bailed out by the non-independent monetary authority 
with a policy much looser than the one before tightening it.  
Thus, if economists during the Great Contraction accused monetary policy to be like a string that 
you could pull on it to stop inflation but could not push to halt recession [4], then Sargent and Wallace 
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would say monetary policy is more like a spring, as pulling on it to stop inflation will only make it 
accumulate potential energy, ready to go wild once this pulling force is removed [5]. 
 
2. Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic.   
Sargent and Wallace defined a “monetarist economy” as one where the monetary base is closely 
connected to the price level and where the monetary authority can always raise revenue from money 
creation (i.e. “seigniorage” or “inflationary finance” [6]). Their purpose was not to prove that the 
monetary authority had limited control over inflation only in a monetarist economy but even in one that 
satisfies these two monetarist assumptions. 
 The people’s demand for bonds ultimately determines the interest rate the government must pay 
on them, and also sets an upper limit on the real stock of bonds relative to the size of the economy (i.e. 
debt as a percentage of GDP). These two restrictions combined do not allow the government to finance 
its budget deficits solely on issuing bonds forever: an increase in its supply of public debt will (other 
things equal) increase the interest it must pay on it, and if the government plans to pay past debt merely 
by issuing new one as in a Ponzi scheme [7], then it must increase its supply at a constantly increasing 
rate, thus reaching faster to this upper limit of debt-GDP ratio. 
Sargent and Wallace argue that whenever the fiscal authority dominates over its monetary 
counterpart, it will autonomously declare its budgets at each period, taking independence away from 
the announcements by the monetary authority regarding its growth rates for base money, as it 
eventually will have to come to its rescue with a loose monetary policy that boosts its seigniorage 
revenue. This statement is not far-fetched at all if we take into account the historic evidence regarding 
the power of the fiscal authority to not just appoint, but also pressure and ultimately replace its 
monetary similar if the latter does not accommodate its needs[8]. 
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It could be argued that (non-inflationary) tax revenue is another source of liquidity for the 
government besides seigniorage and bond issuance, so the amount of debt does not need to increase 
exponentially. However, Sargent and Wallace’s mathematical model only requires the real return on 
government securities (R) to be larger than the growth rate for real income and population (n) for the 
ratio of government borrowing (B) to population (N) to converge dangerously to this upper limit. 
Moreover, their model already uses the letter “D” for “deficit”, implying that it is not the budget itself 
but the amount of expenditure exceeding taxation what the government is really trying to cover. 
This “monetarist arithmetic” may indeed seem “unpleasant”, but it is all built upon a discrete 
dynamical system based on a government’s simplified cash flow equation, where its “cash outflows” are 
these deficits (D) and the reimbursement of past debt plus interest (B+RB), and the “cash inflows” are –
as stated before- the new bond issuance (B) and the real seigniorage revenue, defined as the difference 
in the stock of high-powered money (H) divided by the price level (p). 
Hence, the reasoning behind Sargent and Wallace statement that “Tighter money now can mean 
higher inflation eventually” is the following: (1) If budgets are fixed, a current lower seigniorage must 
imply a current higher bond issuance. (2) A current higher bond issuance implies a future higher 
reimbursement of past debt plus interest.  (3) A future higher reimbursement of past debt plus interest 
necessarily requires future higher seigniorage once the upper limit of debt-GDP ratio is reached or even 
closely approached, as at this point the monetary authority will realize that the revenue of additional 
seigniorage is much larger than the marginal revenue of further bond issuance [9]. 
Thus, according to Sargent and Wallace, Friedman’s assertion that monetary policy can exert long-
run and substantial control over the inflation rate is true only when the monetary authority completely 
dominates over its fiscal counterpart, so that whenever it independently announces the growth rates of 
base money at each period, the fiscal authority adjusts its government budgets accordingly.  
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3. Tighter Money Now Can Mean Higher Inflation Now.  
The problem comes when the monetary authority wrongly believes that it dominates and -at what is 
arbitrarily called “time zero”- autonomously declares the growth rates for the next “T” periods. Then, 
the fiscal authority -being the actual dominant- decides to ignore this announcement and leaves its 
budgets unaltered, thus increasing its deficits until period T is reached, when the monetary authority 
has to declare a new policy. By now though, the monetary authority has realized his true -dominated- 
position and decides to adjust to this new level of government debt by setting up a loose policy -much 
looser than the one before time zero- in order to generate the necessary revenue in the form of 
seigniorage to cover for this debt gap. 
The bigger problem comes when the people in this economy -aware of the increase in government 
debt- rationally predict what will be the new monetary policy after time T (a loose one that yields higher 
inflation) and start altering their behavior before time T arrives in order to try to avoid this seigniorage-
tax burden. Hence, no longer can we expect the “velocity of circulation” component of the equation of 
exchange to be constant, but increasing due to a diminishing demand for money as time T approaches.  
In the growth version of the equation of exchange, since it is being assumed that the monetary 
authority will not change its policy before time T, then this change in current velocity will not alter the 
change in the monetary base. If we additionally assume the change in real output to be unaltered by the 
change in velocity, then this increase in current velocity will be fully reflected in an increase to the 
current price level. That was the reasoning behind Sargent and Wallace’s conclusion about their second 
model:  “tighter money today leads to higher inflation not only eventually but starting today”. 
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4. Concluding Remarks. 
Sargent and Wallace agree that saying “tighter money today lacks even a temporary ability to fight 
inflation” is extreme and overstates the actual limits on tight money. However, they do believe that 
fighting current inflation with a tight monetary policy works only temporarily -and it eventually leads to 
higher inflation- whenever there is a lack of total independence by the monetary authority from its fiscal 
similar. It should not be understood from here though, that they recommended a loose monetary policy 
from the beginning, as in “What’s the point?”  
Sargent and Wallace assumed at all times that the reason why the fiscal authority leaves his budgets 
unaltered after its monetary counterpart announces tighter policies is because the former knew that the 
latter would give in first. However, if the monetary authority remains firm after time “T”, or better yet, 
sets up policy not only for the first T terms but indefinitely, then the fiscal authority will be the one who 
has to concede and adjust his budgets accordingly. As they said, “this form of permanent restraint is a 
mechanism that effectively imposes fiscal discipline”. 
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Appendix:  
I took the liberty to plot in Excel tables B2 and B3 from their Appendix B, “A Model in Which Tighter 
Money Now Can Cause Higher Inflation Now”. As the title suggests, this appendix B is based on Sargent 
and Wallace’s second mathematical model, the one that includes a more realistic demand for money, 
one that depends on the expected rate of inflation. Although the outcome of this second model was 
exaggerated as the authors themselves admitted, it elucidates the importance of rational expectations 
and the consequences of the agents’ predictive behavior. Compare, for example, to the dynamical 
graphs shown in advanced macroeconomic textbooks [10][11]. 
 
Table B3. “An Intermediate Example of the Potential Effects of Tight and Loose Money” (γ1=2, γ2=1.5). 
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Both tables have the common parameter values: R=0.05, n=0.02, T=10, d(t≤T)=0.05, d(t>T)=0, 
H(0)=100, N(0)=1000, B(0)=100, b(1)=1.4999. Where “R” is the real return on bonds, “n” is the 
population growth, “t” is time, “T” is the monetary policy horizon, and “d” is the real government deficit 
net of interest payments per capita. “H(0)”, “N(0)” and “B(0)” are the initial stock of high-powered 
money, population size, and real interest-bearing government debt, respectively. “b(1)” is per capita 
bond holdings at t=1.  
Additionally, “γ1” and “γ2” are the parameters of this realistic demand for money, “γ2” in particular 
measures its susceptibility towards the expected rate of inflation. “Θ” is the rate of growth in “H”.  
 
Table B2. “Another Spectacular Example of the Potential Effects of Tight and Loose Monetary Policy” 
(γ1=3, γ2=2.5). 
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